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Abstract: Alongside the growth in overall employment and the steady rise in average 
real incomes over the 1990s, the UK experienced a concentration of worklessness and 
low pay among certain groups in society. This was particularly acute for low-income 
families with children, but was also reflected in the frequency of spells out of work by 
the young and by the falling attachment to the labour market of older men. In response, 
the focus of welfare policy shifted towards “making work pay”. The Working Families 
Tax Credit and the New Deal were central among the policy options that were 
implemented. This lecture considers the validity of the arguments underlying this shift 
in welfare policy and, drawing on evidence from the UK and abroad, asks: which 
policies work and why? It examines two broad classes of policy options that are 
motivated by the make work pay objective: active labour market programmes that 
involve wage subsidies together with improved job matching; and earned income tax 
credits that supplement wages for working low-income families. These programmes 
have many features in common. They are also similar to many policy reforms in Europe 
and North America. Using the evaluation of the UK reforms this lecture brings 
empirical evidence into the debate on the effectiveness of these programmes and 
assesses which aspects of the design of welfare to work programmes work well and 
which aspects could be improved.  
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1 Introduction 
This lecture considers the arguments behind the expansion in welfare to work 
programmes that occurred over the last decade and reviews the effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to enhancing labour market attachment and earnings among the 
low skilled. It concerns the ‘iron triangle’ of welfare reform – that is the three, often 
conflicting, goals: raising the living standards of those on low incomes; encouraging 
work and economic self-sufficiency; and keeping government costs low. Many different 
policies can be cast in terms of these broad aims, albeit with different weights attached 
to each of the goals. In the UK there are active labour market programmes like the New 
Deal and there are also financial incentive programmes like the Working Families Tax 
Credit. Although the latter are often classed as welfare policies and the former as active 
labour market policies, both are motivated by similar concerns over low incomes and 
low labour market attachment and share many similar design features. The key 
organizing idea in this lecture is to provide an integrated view of the way the wide array 
of ‘welfare to work’ and ‘make work pay’ policies affect the earnings, incomes and 
incentives of working age individuals and their families. The aim is to assess their 
effectiveness in addressing low income, low earnings and low labour market attachment 
in the working age population?   
Other countries, most notably the US and Canada, have implemented a similar 
array of policies and I will draw on the extensive evaluations of these in the discussion 
that follows. However, the UK over the last decade is, in many ways, an ideal test bed 
in which to examine such policy reforms since both the WFTC and the New Deal
1 were 
introduced and enhanced over this period. These policies are targeted at two groups: (1) 
low income/low educated families with young children, (2) low skilled workers with 
long or repeat unemployment spells. In both cases the diagnosis was similar: relatively 
low hourly wages with little labour market experience implying little incentive for 
                                                 
1 Here we refer explicitly for the New Deal for Young People, directed towards 18-24 year olds with at 
least six months unemployment. However, there are now similar policies in the UK directed toward those 
on disability benefit (New Deal for Disabled People), for those aged over twenty five – 25 Plus, for Lone 
Parents and for older workers - 50 plus. Although different, each have similar characteristics and are 
subject to similar design issues.    3
work.
2 However, the detail is different. In the first case it is the generosity of the out of 
work benefit system for families relative to potential earnings and child-care costs that 
are thought to provide the disincentive. For the second group it is employer matching 
and the low initial wages that are perceived as the central issue. Consequently, although 
the prescription for both is to enhance net earnings in work, the first involves a long-
term income related supplement to earnings, possibly with a childcare component. 
While the second centers on job search assistance and short term employer based 
employment subsidies. But to what extent are these differences in the design of welfare 
to work programmes appropriate and could they be improved?  
The ‘in-work’ structure of these two approaches is similar relying on earnings 
credits or employment/wage subsidies. But again they typically work rather differently. 
The wage subsidy is individually based, not means-tested and has limited duration. 
Eligibility is also typically dependent on a certain duration unemployment insurance (or 
welfare) receipt. The tax credit, on the other hand, is typically subject to a family 
income based means-test and does not have a time limit. For the later, the WFTC in the 
UK, the EITC in the US
3 and the In-Work Tax Credit in Belgium
4 are prime examples. 
For the former, the New Deal in the UK and Work First
5 in the US are leading 
examples. There are, of course, many welfare to work policies that fall somewhere in 
between. For example, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP)
6 in Canada, although an in-
work tax credit like the WFTC or EITC, has a three year time-limit and eligibility 
depends not only on overall family income and family composition but also on a 
minimum welfare duration and a minimum hours requirement. The New Hope
7 tax 
credit programme in the US also has a three-year time limit and a minimum hours 
condition. Both programmes provide job search assistance at least for some of 
                                                 
2The ‘scaring’ effect of spells of unemployment and welfare is also raised as a further deterrent to work 
(see Gregg and Wadsworth (1999)).  
3 See Eissa and Liebman (1996). 
4 See Gradus and Jusling (2001), who also review similar schemes and proposals in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Finland. 
5 See Holcomb, Pavetti, Ratcliffe and Riedinger (1998) for a review of these schemes. In particular the 
Work Mandate designs which are very close to the design of the New Deal. 
6 See Card and Robins, (1998). 
7 See Bos, et. al. (1999).   4
programme participants.
8 The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP)
9, is 
similar to the SSP, however the job search assistance is mandatory as in the New Deal 
for Young People in the UK. An additional feature of these Canadian and US 
programmes is that many were the subject of randomised experimental evaluation, the 
results of which provide a vital source of information in the discussion below. Finally, 
the earnings supplement and job search provisions within the many state run additions 
to the Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) programme in the US have similar 
characteristics to the New Deal programme (see Blank and Card, 2000).   
So what is the best design for such policies? How should they differ with 
demographic characteristics? Does time limiting the in-work financial incentives help 
with human capital and wage progression? If so, how long should the time limit be set? 
Should there be a duration of welfare or a duration of UI recipiency requirement for 
eligibility. If so, for how long? Should there be mandatory job search assistance and/or 
accredited training? If so, how should sanctions apply? Should family income means 
testing be used to target incentives to those on low incomes?  If so, at what level should 
the credit withdrawal or phase-out rate be set?  Should the wage subsidy or tax credit be 
tied to a specific employer? Should there be a minimum hours requirement? Should 
childcare costs be incorporated in the financial incentive? 
The recent proposal by the UK government
10 to separate the child component of 
WFTC from the adult component so as to form an integrated child credit (ICC) and an 
employment tax credit (ETC), provides a further motivation for investigating the overall 
design features of in-work benefits and other make work pay policies. This is especially 
the case once it is recognized that the new ETC will be open to all adults irrespective of 
whether they have children.  
There is also a growing theoretical literature examining the role of work 
requirements in the design of optimal income transfer programmes. In a dynamic model 
the important issue relates to incentives for poverty reducing investments and 
                                                 
8 Quets et al (1999) provide a careful evaluation of the effect of adding job search services to the SSP. 
This evidence is used later in our discussion of job search assistance in financial incentive programmes.  
9See Miller et. al., 1997. Continuation of the MFIP in work is conditional on accredited training for 
workers who do not have children under one year old and who are in jobs of less than 30 hours per week.     
10 Inland Revenue (2001).   5
investments in human capital. Besley and Coate (1992) derive conditions under which 
workfare can be optimal. Cossa, Heckman and Lalonde (1999) develop a dynamic 
model with time limits and human capital investment. In a more static setting the recent 
contribution by Saez (2000) shows that, where labour supply responses are concentrated 
along the extensive margin (participation in work), an Earned Income Tax Credit 
system with transfers that increase with earnings at low levels can be optimal and 
justifies the move away from negative income tax schemes.  
Examining the impact of such reforms on employment and on poverty requires a 
careful analysis. In any programme of this type there will be those that are induced into 
employment by the programme and those who benefit financially from it but are already 
in employment or who would have moved in to employment anyway.
11 The distinction 
between these groups is key and we will draw on experimental and non-experimental 
evidence to gauge their likely size. Similarly any reliable evaluation requires a control 
group for comparison. This is in turn made more difficult when there are spill over 
effects (through displacement or more general equilibrium effects) on to groups that are 
not directly eligible. Again where possible we will pay attention to the importance of 
these effects, most notably in the analysis of the mandatory job search and wage subsidy 
elements of the New Deal policy.         
To set the scene for our analysis we turn, in the next section, to the labour market 
trends over the last two decades that motivated the UK reforms. The cyclical volatility 
of employment for certain target groups and the secular changes in employment patterns 
for others is highlighted. Section 3 then considers a number of central design features, 
focussing on time limits, means testing and implicit tax rates, minimum hours 
requirements, welfare receipt eligibility, and wage progression. This is done in the 
context of the design of the New Deal and of the WFTC. In section 4 we move on to 
evaluate specific aspects of the New Deal and WFTC reforms. We conclude, in section 
5, with an overview of these schemes and their effectiveness, and an assessment of the 
appropriate design of welfare to work and make work pay programmes. 
                                                 
11 These are sometimes referred to as the ‘windfall beneficiaries’ of the programme.   6
2  The Changing Structure and Economic Environment of Low Wage 
Workers in the UK 
This section considers the labour market trends that stimulated the New Deal 
and WFTC reforms in the UK. Turning first to the labour market for the young 
unskilled that motivated the New Deal (for Young People) NDYP programme, we 
highlight the cyclical volatility of unemployment for this group and the frequency of 
short run transitions. We then move on to the corresponding employment trends for 
low-income families with children, which motivated the WFTC reform.  Here non-
employment rather than claimant unemployment or active job search is a more relevant 
measure of activity and we highlight the importance of both cyclical and secular trends.  
2.1 The Labour Market Background for the New Deal Reform 
The New Deal for Young People was directed at 18-24 year olds with more than 
6 months unemployment. Across all countries youth unemployment is higher than 
unemployment for prime age individuals. In the late 1990s there was a relatively high 
proportion of young Britons in jobs and a low proportion of young people in full time 
education. There was a large proportion of British youth that are neither in school nor in 
the labour force. Moreover, in the 1990s the UK had the highest numbers of 18-year-old 
men in this category and was second (after Italy) for 22-year-old men
12. It also had the 
UK had the largest increase in the proportion of this group of youth.  
Another feature of the youth labour market is its sensitivity to the business 
cycle.
 13 The level of unemployment of the younger group, displayed in Figure 2, 
broadly mirrors the overall picture in Figure 1, but the cycle is, if anything, more 
pronounced. This is also true for employment rates as can be seen from Figure 3 (see 
also Bell, Blundell and Van Reenen, 1999).  The extent of cyclicality, and the 
differences across the cycle in unemployment and employment rates by age, is 
particularly important for the evaluation of the impact of welfare to work programmes 
                                                 
12 The proportion of NEETs (not in employment, education or training), sometimes referred to as the 
‘idle’, was 8.4% in the UK in 1997 compared to 2.3% in 1984. In 1997 the corresponding figure was 
5.6% in the US, 4.2% in Germany, 3.3% in France and 9.1% in Italy (see Blanchflower and Freeman, 
2000)). 
13See Nickell (1999) for an extensive review of the British data. Hoynes (2000) also notes a strong degree 
of sensitivity to the cycle among young welfare recipients and low skilled workers in the US.     7
like the New Deal. For example, if a group of similar but older men were to be used as a 
comparison group for  
 



























































   


































































































































Six months and over
12 months and over
Figure 2: Claimant unemployment amongst 18-24 year olds
 
 
Source: Labour Market Trends and Employment Gazette, various issues 




those entering the New Deal then adjustment for cyclical differences across the groups 
would be crucial. Otherwise the impact of cyclical differentials would be incorrectly 
attributed to the New Deal reform. This is highlighted in our examination of the impact 
of the New Deal on employment in section 4 below. 
 
2.2 The Labour Market Background for the WFTC Reform 
The high levels of non-employment, experienced by certain specific 
demographic groups, were also the motivation for earned income tax credit reforms – or 
in-work benefit reforms. For example, one central stimulus for the introduction and 
subsequent expansion of the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK was the 
persistence in the low levels of attachment to the labour market by single mothers - at a 
time when for other groups of similar women attachment was generally been increasing. 
Figure 4 shows the secular change in female employment across four household types in 
the UK.  The growth in the attachment by women in couples with children is as 
year





Figure 3: The Impact of the Cycle on Employment Rates by Age
% Employment 
Rate  9
noticeable as is the fall for single women with children.
14 This is even more pronounced 
for those who left school at age 16 or before (age 16 being the minimum school leaving 
age for those born after 1960).  Not only has attachment of lone mothers fallen but, at 
the same time, the size of this group has risen by more that twofold over the last twenty  
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Notes: FES Data, working age. 
 
years. Blundell and Hoynes (2001) document this change and examine the similarities 
between demographic trends for single mothers in the UK and US. 
Another distinguishing feature of the UK has been the growth in workless 
couples with children. This is documented in Figure 5 and provided a strong argument 
in the debate over the WFTC reform (see Gregg, Hansen and Wadsworth (1999)). 
Indeed, for women in couples with unemployed partners employment rates have stayed 
no higher than 30% over the past two decades – even lower than employment rates for 
the single parent group (see Blundell (2001)). The (non-) employment rates for these 
                                                 
14 These figures are drawn from the repeated cross-sections of the British Family Expenditure Survey. As 
such they refer to different people over time and will therefore exhibit systematic composition changes 
according to birth cohort, education and other factors.   10 
two groups show clearly why they have been singled out as two target groups for tax 
and benefit reform. 
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Notes: FES Data. Working age head. 
2.3 Inequality and the Real Wages of the Young Low Skilled 
It is not just the low employment rates among the low skilled that have attracted 
attention. So have the low real wages and the relatively slow growth in these wages 
over the past two decades.
15 Indeed, there have been well documented and remarkable 
shifts in returns to education and skill in many countries (see Gosling, Machin and 
Meghir (2000) for the UK and Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey of international 
evidence).  For example, in the U.S. real earnings for the lowest education groups fell 
yearly from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s. This characteristic was quite exaggerated 
in the U.S., but the overall pattern was common to most developed countries.  Indeed, 
there is evidence that lower educated younger workers have seen a stronger decline in 
their wages relative to those with more education over the last two decades
16, reducing 
further the incentives to take paid employment. 
                                                 
15 See Dickens (2000) and the references therein. 
16 See Blundell and Preston (1998).   11 
3  The New Deal and WFTC Reforms in Context 
The simple but stark facts about the low skill labour market, reviewed in the last 
section, focussed policy attention in the UK on ‘make work pay’ policy reforms for the 
low skilled, the aim being to make work more attractive for those whose current labour 
market opportunities are not sufficient to induce work. As mentioned in the introduction 
the key organising idea of this lecture is to place the various ‘welfare to work’ or ‘make 
work pay’ reforms alongside each other, to focus on specific design features and to 
examine the importance of each of these features in addressing the objectives: raising 
the living standards of those on low incomes; and encouraging work and economic self-
sufficiency. Before considering design issues, we first consider the specific 
characteristics of the New Deal and the WFTC policies in the UK. In our general 
discussion that follows we will then compare these features with those of similar 
reforms in North America, Canada and elsewhere. 
3.1 The Design of the New Deal  
The New Deal for Young People in the UK, which was launched in early 1998, is 
targeted at the 18 to 24 years old with at least six months unemployment. Participation 
is compulsory, so that every eligible individual who refuses to participate risks losing 
their entitlement to benefits. The criteria for eligibility are simple: every individual aged 
between 18 and 24 by the time of completion of the sixth month on Job Seekers' 
Allowance (JSA) – the standard flat rate Unemployment Insurance in the UK - is 
assigned to the programme and starts receiving treatment. Given the stated rules, the 
programme can be classified as one of “global implementation”, being administered to 
everyone in the UK meeting the eligibility criteria. Indirect effects that spill over to 
other groups than the treatment group may occur. The nature of these effects will be 
discussed below. 
The path of a participant through the New Deal is composed of three main steps 
(see Figure 6). On assignment to the programme, the individual starts the first stage of 
the treatment called the Gateway. It lasts for up to 4 months and is composed of 
intensive job-search assistance and small basic skills' courses. Each individual is 
assigned a “Personal advisor”, a mentor who they meet at least once every two weeks to 
encourage/enforce job search. The aim is to place individuals in unsubsidised   12 
employment (although there are a proportion who exited into subsidised jobs before 
exhausting the gateway period). 
The second stage is composed of four possible options. First, there is the employer 
option - a six-month spell on a subsidized employment. For the subsidized employment 
option, the employer receives a £60 a week wage subsidy during the first six months of 
employment plus an additional £750 payment for a required minimum amount of job 
training equivalent to one day a week
17. Second, an individual can enroll in a stipulated 
full-time education or training course and receive an equivalent amount to the JSA 
payment for up to twelve months (and may be eligible for special grants in order to 
cover exceptional expenses). Third, individuals can work in the voluntary sector for up 
to six months (paid a wage or allowance at least equal to JSA plus £400 spread over the 
six months). Finally, they may take a job on the Environmental Task Force (essentially 
government jobs) and be paid a wage or allowance at least equal to JSA plus £400 
(spread over the six months).
18 
                                                 
17 This is quite generous. The mean starting wage for those on a subsidized job is £3.78 an hour, implying 
a 40 per cent level of subsidy for a 37 hour week. 
18 Once the option period is over, if the individual has not managed to keep/find a job or leave the 
claimant count for any other reason, the third stage of the program is initiated, the Follow Through. This 
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The programme was launched in the whole UK in April 1998. There was, however, 
a previous Pilot three months’ period, from January to March 1998, when the 
programme was implemented in 12 areas, called the Pathfinder Pilots (see Anderson, 
Riley and Young, 1999). Clearly, identification of the treatment effect under these 
conditions requires stronger assumptions than when an experiment is run within regions 
using random assignment. The problem relates to the fact that the counterfactual must 
either be drawn from a different labour market or from a group with different 
characteristics operating in the same labour market. However, we are able to use the 
features of the pathfinder pilots in comparison to non-pathfinder areas to examine the 
impact of the policy and the potential issues concerning substitution effects and general 
equilibrium effects. These evaluation issues are discussed in detail in Blundell, Costa-
Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001), in section 4 below we simply summarise the 
results of that evaluation study and draw conclusions for the appropriateness of its 
design. 
3.2  The Design of the WFTC 
In-work benefits have existed in the UK in various forms since the 1970s. However, 
the current Working Families Tax Credit has its antecedents in the Family Credit system 
introduced in the late 1980s.
19 The Family Credit was designed to provide support for 
low wage working families. In this system each eligible family was paid a credit up to a 
maximum amount which depended on the number of children. There was also a small 
addition if in full time work. Eligibility depended on family net income being lower 
than some threshold (£79.00 per week in 1998-99). As incomes rose the credit was 
withdrawn at a rate of 70%. In 1996 average payments were around £57 a week and 
take-up rates stood at 69% of eligible individuals and 82% of the potential expenditure.  
A striking feature of the Family Credit system, retained in the WFTC reform, is a 
minimum weekly hours eligibility condition. A family with children required one adult 
working 16 hours or more per week to qualify. At its introduction in 1988 this minimum 
hours cut-off was set at 24 hours but then reduced in 1992 to encourage part-time work 
                                                                                                                                               
is a process similar to the Gateway, taking up to 13 weeks, where job-search assistance is the main 
treatment being provided. 
19 See Blundell and Hoynes (2001) for a brief historical review.   14 
by lone parents with young children (see Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir 
(1999)). 
The WFTC reform increased the generosity of in-work support relative to the FC 
system in four ways: It increased the credit for younger children. It increased the 
threshold. It reduced the benefit reduction rate from 70% to 55%. Finally, the reform 
incorporated a childcare credit. This was worth 70% of actual childcare costs up to £150 
per week (for two children, £100 for one child). The largest cash gains went to those 
people were currently just at the end of the benefit reduction taper.  
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The credit was available to lone parents and couples where both partners work more 
than 16 hours per week. The transfers (excluding childcare credit) underlying the 
WFTC are illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
   15 
Figure 8: Single Mother before WFTC 
Notes: Single parent, April 1997, earning £3.50 per hour (2000 prices). 
Figure 9: Single Mother after WFTC 
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Child Benefit Net earnings Income Support Family Credit Rent rebate Local tax rebate  16 
The impact of the WFTC reform relative to existing Family Credit is shown in the 
budget constraint for a ‘typical’ single parent presented in Figures 8 and 9. These 
highlight the similarity of the FC and WFTC systems. They also highlight another 
central design feature: the importance of interactions between the in-work tax credit 
system and other means tested benefits. In particular income support and housing 
benefit seriously reduce the underlying incentive in the system (see Blundell, 2001, for 
further discussion).  
Despite the dampening effect of these interactions with other benefits, there does 
seem to be some prima facie evidence of an impact on behaviour. A look at the 
histogram of weekly hours worked for single parents presented in Figure 10a, for 
example, shows a strong peak in hours worked at 16 hours. This is not evident for 
ineligible groups such as single childless low educated working women as reported in 
Figure 10b. Of course, there will be a large number of so called ‘windfall beneficiaries’ 
and there may also be those who decide to reduce their working hours in response to the  
 















   17 
Figure 10b: Weekly Hours Worked: Low Education Single Women without 















Notes: Family Resources Survey, 1998/99; Blundell and Hoynes (2001). 
 
incentive at 16 hours. These issues will be considered in the evaluation of the impact of 
WFTC reform on hours and employment in section 4 below. 
It is worth noting at this stage that many of these design features are absent in 
other employment/earnings tax credit systems. The EITC in the US, for example, has no 
minimum working hours condition and the level of the credit is not counted as income 
in the computation of other taxes and benefits.
20 There is also a small EITC available to 
low earning workers without children in the US. In the Canadian SSP there is a 30 
weekly working hour condition (averaged over a month) but receipt of the credit is time 
limited to three years and eligibility requires a 12 month welfare duration, not simply a 
low family income as in the EITC and WFTC. 
                                                 
20 See Brewer (2000).   18 
3.3 Aspects of Design  
  The discussion so far of the New Deal and the WFTC programmes in the UK 
has highlighted certain central features in the design of these make work pay 
programmes. Here we gather them together under the following seven headings: 
 
1.  Time Limits and Wage Progression 
There are a number of ways in which time limits have been incorporated in 
welfare to work programmes.  The US debate has focussed mainly on the time limits in 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme (see Moffitt and 
Pavetti, 2000).  In this programme of income support the individual state can set a 
lifetime limit for receipt. Typically set at 60 months (the maximum allowed) and 
introduced in 1996, these time limits are just beginning to bind. Perhaps not surprisingly 
many individuals have left welfare before the limit and there is consequently some 
evidence that the limits themselves have helped in the dramatic reduction in welfare 
rolls in the US (Grogger, 2000). Part of the success of the New Deal in the UK 
documented below is the effective time limit it places on receipt of JSA, although it is 
difficult, in the UK context, to separate the effect of this from the mandatory job search 
assistance and benefit sanctions that are included as part of the programme. 
Time limits can equally well be imposed on the receipt of financial incentives in 
work. This is not a feature of the WFTC or EITC. But it is part of the Canadian SSP tax 
credit system and it does feature in the earnings disregard programmes that form part of 
the individual state specific features of the TANF programme. These vary from 6 
months for the New Deal and Work First and JOBS Plus
21 programmes to three years in 
the case of SSP and many of the TANF based programmes in the US.
22 The appropriate 
design of such time limits depends on the expected level of wage progression for 
programme participants and the incentives for wage progression created by the time-
limited system itself.  
Incentives for wage progression are often enhanced by the provision of training 
– a central part of the New Deal programme. With no time limit, tax credit systems can 
provide a strong negative incentive for wage progression and human capital investment, 
                                                 
21 See Dickert-Conlin and Holz-Eakin (2000). 
22 See Pavetti and Strong (2001).   19 
reducing the chance of longer run self-sufficiency. This will depend largely on the 
relative importance of the passive return to work experience, which occurs 
automatically once in work, in comparison with the return to ‘active’ human capital 
investment, which requires effort or time inputs by the individual. Cossa, Heckman and 
Lochner (1999) make this point forcibly. However, evidence of steep wage progression 
among low skilled workers is rare. Most studies suggest that wage progression will be 
slow, no more than 3-4% per year, see Gladden and Taber (2000). This is further 
supported by the recent work by Card, Michalopoulos and Robins (2001) on the wage 
growth among the recipients of the Canadian SSP experiment. Consequently, a six-
month time limit is unlikely to provide time for wage progression to result in self-
sufficiency and could be counter productive. At the end of the subsidy either workers 
will move to lower wages, lose their employment or move into some other ‘make work 
pay’ programme. For example, the EITC in the US is used by many as a way of 
working themselves off time limited earnings supplements in TANF. But then in the 
EITC the incentives for active wage progression and human capital investment, once in 
work, are slight.  
 
2. Means Testing and Implicit Tax Rates 
  A key ingredient in understanding the structure of financial incentives 
underlying make work pay policies is their interaction with the tax and benefit system. 
Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the comparison between the EITC in the US 
and the WFTC in the UK.  As we have seen above, in the UK the level of WFTC credit 
counts as income in means tested benefit programmes like Housing Benefit. This is 
deliberate and was part of the Family Credit reform in 1988. It ensures there are no 
implicit tax rates on earnings that exceed 100%. But implicit tax rates can be high, as is 
evident from figures 8 and 9.  
In contrast, the EITC shown in Figure 11, although providing a less generous 
credit, sits on top of the tax and benefit system.  A consequence of this is that the lower 
withdrawal rates (phase-out rates) in EITC must be added to the implicit tax rates in 
TANF, Food Stamps and the income tax system. A typical budget constraint for a US 
EITC recipient  
   20 
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Stamps requirements are met, and that all income is earned. 
   21 



















Child Benefit Net income Income Support WFTC
Notes: Assumes 2000 tax and benefit system plus a Children's Tax Credit. Ignores housing and childcare costs and subsidies. Assumes 2 WFTC 
awards/year and minimum wage work, so that eligibility for WFTC occurs at £3,078 and 30 hour premium at £5,772.
 
Source: Brewer (2000). 
 
is drawn in Figure 12, which should be contrasted with the similar UK system in Figure 
13. 
 
For couples, there a further issue is whether the tax credit should be subject to an 
individual or a family means test. As is argued below, a family based system creates 
adverse incentives for labour supply of ‘secondary’ workers in the household. However, 
such a system is well targeted to family poverty and to the reduction of workless 
households. In contrast, individual tax credits can better target low wage workers and 
low skills. A family means test means that work incentives can be improved for one and 
worsened for another partner, and can alter (usually worsen) the incentives to form a 
couple/marry. Both EITC and WFTC use a family income means test.  
 
3.Setting the Level of Credit or Subsidy 
  The appropriate level of the credit or subsidy is intricately tied to whether it is to 
be means tested and whether it is time limited. The typical wage or employment   22 
subsidy, as in the New Deal, is a fixed weekly sum, time limited and independent of 
family income and composition. In contrast the credit in WFTC is means tested, varies 
with family composition and has no time limit. In some sense this reflects no more than 
the desire to achieve distributional objectives with the WFTC, in particular the desire to 
reduce the level of child poverty. Nonetheless the proposed separation of the child 
component in the WFTC in to an integrated child credit (ICC) (see Brewer, Clark and 
Myck, 2001), leaves an adult employment tax credit (ETC) that is available to those 
without children and whose level is much less about child poverty.  
  A higher level of credit implies a higher withdrawal rate, unless the credit is to 
extend high in to the earnings and income distribution. Indeed the increased generosity 
underlying the WFTC reform together with the reduction in the withdrawal rate, 
extended eligibility and the phase-out region much higher into the income distribution 
than had previously been the case. Increasing the cost of the programme and the number 
of recipients with relatively high incomes. The price for extending generosity at lower 
earnings, without increasing withdrawal rates, is a higher implicit tax rate further up the 
income distribution.
23   
 
4. Minimum Hours Conditions 
  Minimum hours conditions can reduce costs and remove the incentive to reduce 
hours to very low levels. However, if they are set too high they reduce the attractiveness 
of the programme to individuals out of employment, especially those that have young 
children. The reduction in the hours condition, from 24 at the introduction of Family 
Credit to 16 in WFTC, can be seen to have encouraged a significant fraction of inactive 
single parents in to work (see Dilnot and Duncan (1992) and Blundell and Hoynes 
(2001), for a discussion). It also reduced the number of hours worked by many single 
parents in employment. It should be noted that in 1995 a 30 hour ‘full time’ bonus of 
£10 was introduced.
24 In comparison EITC has no minimum hours condition whereas 
SSP in Canada and New Hope in the US have a 30 hours condition. Some have argued 
for hourly wage based credits to address the adverse hours and effort incentives.
25  
                                                 
23 See IFS (1999) for a discussion of the impact of the WFTC reform on implicit tax rates. 
24 This is the second ‘peak’ in Figure 7. 
25 See MaCurdy and McIntyre (2001), for example.   23 
Help with childcare costs can overturn some of these arguments. Indeed, the 
WFTC has a generous childcare credit. Also note that the proposed Employment Tax 
Credit in the UK is set to have a 30 hours condition for adults without children. It may 
well be true that wage progression in part time low skilled  jobs is quite slow.
26  
 
5. Training requirements and Human Capital Incentives 
  Many of the issues concerning individual incentives for human capital 
investment and wage progression have been made in the discussion of time limits and 
wage progression above. However, there are remaining issues concerning training 
provision. There is also strong evidence that workplace based training that leads to a 
vocational qualification is the most effective, at least for the lower skilled with 
relatively low formal education levels (see Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1997 and 
references therein).  
Is it possible to design an effective training incentive within an individually 
based tax credit system? Presumably, provided training is monitoring and leads 
accredited qualifications, an individual incentive scheme can be as effective as one 
operated through the employer. It may have the added attraction allowing, or even 
enhancing, mobility. There is also no reason why accredited training should not be a 
condition of continuing receipt of an employment tax credit or wage subsidy.  
    
6. Welfare, UI Duration Requirements and Programme Take-Up 
  Welfare receipt conditions are chosen so as to reduce costs and target the 
workless. SSP in Canada requires a 12-month duration on welfare for eligibility. But 
like WFTC and EITC, the New Hope programme simply uses low income as an 
eligibility condition. The New Deal has a 6-month unemployment claimant condition.  
There are many other examples in other similar programmes. 
  There are a number of counter arguments to such targeting. The first is the 
stigma impact perceived by both employer and employee. This is often cited as the 
reason for the low take up, especially among employer based subsidy schemes.
27 The 
                                                 
26 As noted already, empirical evidence on wage progression for specific types of workers is sadly 
lacking. Reliable evidence for low skilled workers is dogged by selection and attrition problems as 
highlighted in the study of age growth in the SSP treatment population by Card et al (2001). 
27 See Katz (1998).   24 
second is the churning or cycling effect. Since eligibility depends on welfare receipt 
individuals have an incentive to churn or cycle through the system and the long run 
impact of such programmes on employment will be mitigated (see Grubb and Martin, 
2001, and Meyer, 1995, for example). Finally there is an entry effect where by those 
with short durations on welfare extend their spell to become eligible for the financial 
incentive.  
It is clear that all these issues play a role. Indeed there is recent evidence, from 
the Swedish welfare to work programmes
28, that it may be important to act as soon as 
workers enter unemployment, or the welfare system, and not to wait. However, the 
argument in terms of reducing the number of so called ‘windfall beneficiaries’ often 
wins the day, see the discussion in Card and Blank (2000). There is an important 
balance to be made and it may well be the case that a welfare recipient condition, as in 
the Canadian SSP, together with a relatively long time limit for receipt of the credit is 
an optimal schedule for helping those on welfare in to work, supporting their income 
and leaving some incentive for wage progression and human capital investment. Once 
again though, if the only way to obtain the financial incentive is to have a period on 
welfare, there is an important issue of how to guard against inducing long welfare spells 
and cycling.  
 
7. Active Provision of Job Search Assistance 
  One important difference between various make work pay and welfare to work 
programmes is whether they provide job search assistance. In some ways the EITC and 
WFTC programmes, by focussing on workers, do not directly face this issue. But in so 
far as they are designed to enhance labour market attachment, job search assistance for 
new entrants and those likely to enter the programme would seem quite plausible.
29 The 
New Deal for Lone Parents in the UK act in this way as once in work the Lone Parents 
become eligible to WFTC. On the job help in improving matching of workers could also 
be an important way of enhancing earnings through job mobility for such workers. 
  What kind of job search help should be given and should it be mandatory? The 
New Deal for Young People described above is mandatory and provides the participant 
                                                 
28 See Sianesi (2001).   25 
with a personal advisor, with meetings at least once every two weeks to 
encourage/enforce job search. Missing a meeting can incur sanctions. This may be the 
effective part of the Gateway and builds on the apparent success of the Restart 
interviews
30. However, it may well be the possibility of financial sanctions that had 
most impact.
31 Certainly the additional impact of voluntary job search advisors in the 
SSP randomised experiment had a relatively small impact over the financial incentives 
alone, on longer-term full time jobs
32. Mandatory job search assistance in the MFIP had 
a bigger effect.
33   
  Before further discussion of what components of a welfare to work system are 
likely to work and for whom they work best, we turn our attention to the evaluation of 
the two UK programmes on which we have focused: the New Deal and the WFTC.   
4  Evaluating the Labour Market Impact of Reforms 
The first concern of any evaluation is whether the appropriate statistical approach 
has been adopted. There is a growing use of experimental evaluations and 
demonstration projects, especially in North America.
34 These clearly have some 
advantage over observational studies and they can provide important evidence to 
benchmark the discussion that follows.  
However, experiments do not address all concerns and they do not adapt well to 
extrapolation and to the study of variations in policy design. Area based studies can also 
be attractive. As mentioned above the piloting of the New Deal in pathfinder areas 
provides some useful information on certain spillover effects.
35  
In some cases so called ‘natural experiments’ are useful. These occur when a 
control group appears naturally in the data rather than through a randomised 
experiment. For example, there may be a very similar group to the target group that is 
ineligible to the programme. Provided they have the same macro economic trends and 
                                                                                                                                               
29 As already noted, there is no reason why continuation of the credit could not be conditional on various 
advancement conditions oriented toward wage progression such as job search and accredited training.  
30 Dolton and O’Neill (1996).  
31 See Abbring, Van Berg and Van Ours (1997) for further evidence on the effectiveness of sanctions on 
transition rates into employment from unemployment. 
32 This is referred to as the SSP Plus experiment in Quets et al (1999). 
33 Miller et al (1999), and the discussion in Card and Blank (2000). 
34 See Riccio and Bloom (2001), for example.   26 
there are no systematic composition changes before and after the programme
36, a simple 
difference in differences methodology can provide a useful guide to the extent of a 
policy impact. Of course this is an ex-post evaluation.  
Ex-ante evaluations either arise through an experimental demonstration project or 
through a structural econometric model in which the proposed reform can be 
simulated.
37 It is also sometimes possible to use matching on observables to mimic the 
controlled experiment. Where rich administrative data sources are available for 
evaluation, this is a particularly attractive approach
38.  
We will make use of all these alternative methods in what follows. We turn first to 
specific aspects of the New Deal and WFTC policies. 
4.1 The Impact of the New Deal for Young People 
Although there is now some evidence of the impact of employment of individuals 
completing the options in the New Deal, we focus here on an evaluation of the 
Gateway.
39 In particular, we are concerned with the degree to which enhanced 
mandatory job assistance has lead to more outflows to (unsubsidised) employment. The 
evaluation is based on data provided by the Pathfinder areas before the National Roll 
Out of the programme, as well as on data available following the National Roll Out.  
As mentioned above, there are two main issues that need to be considered in 
evaluating the impact of the programme: the precise nature of the comparison group, 
and hence the definition of what is being measured, and the set of assumptions that 
underlie the interpretation of the parameter we estimate in each case. The clear 
understanding of these issues is an important input in an eventual cost-benefit analysis 
of the programme since they determine the outcome from the programme.
40 There are 
some important aspects covered within this discussion. One of them concerns the extent 
to which we can estimate the overall impact of the programme on employment as 
opposed to the impact on the eligible individuals. Potential differences in the two 
                                                                                                                                               
35 See also the design of the New Deal for Long Term Unemployed, 25 Plus, analysed in Lissenburgh 
(2001) 
36 See Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998). 
37 See Blundell and MaCurdy (2000), for a review. 
38 See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
39 Bonjour et al (2001) and Dorsett (2001) provide a detailed description of the option and post-option 
results.    27 
outcomes may result from two main factors. First, the impact of the programme on 
eligible individuals may be at the expense of worsened labour market opportunities for 
similar but ineligible individuals. Second, the wider implementation of the programme 
and the opportunities it offers to participants may affect the equilibrium level of wages 
and employment, affecting all workers. We focus on the impact of the programme on 
the proportion leaving unemployment within four months of entering the Gateway. We 
pay special attention to the outflows into employment, but we also examine total 
outflows from unemployment to all destinations.
41 
Our approach to estimating the impact of the New Deal programme relies on using 
information from the pilot period as well as information from the National Roll out. The 
New Deal can affect employment of both eligible and ineligible individuals in a number 
of ways. First the eligible individuals receive job search assistance, which may enhance 
their ability to find a job. Second, some of the individuals in the Gateway programme 
receive wage subsidies, reducing the cost of employing them for an initial period of six 
months. This wage subsidy will expand the employment of such workers but may also 
lead to a substitution of other workers for these cheaper ones. The extent to which this 
may happen will depend on a number of factors. If the subsidy just covers the deficit in 
productivity and the reservation wage of the workers as well as the costs of training, we 
would not expect any substitution; these workers are no cheaper than anyone else. 
Second, it will depend on the extent that these workers are substitutable in production 
for existing workers and on the extent that it is easy to churn workers. The latter is an 
important point, since the subsidy only lasts six months. Moreover the agencies 
implementing the New Deal are supposed to be monitoring the behavior of firms using 
wage subsidies and employing individuals on the New Deal. Of course if job durations 
are generally short, firms will be able to use subsidized workers instead of the non-
subsidized ones, without any extra effort.  
                                                                                                                                               
40 See Van Reenen (2001) for a careful cost benefit analysis of the New Deal. 
41 Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001) assess the importance of the estimated effects 
and interpret them in an historical perspective. They provide some lower and upper bounds for the 
treatment effect by using other pre-program time periods. This can be done for total outflow for all years 
since 1982.   28 
An additional effect of the New Deal may be to decrease wage pressure through the 
increase in labour supply and through the presence of wage subsidies.
42 This will tend to 
increase employment for all types of workers and will counteract the effects of 
substitution on the non-treatment group. 
Assessing the importance of substitution and of general equilibrium effects through 
wages or other channels is of central importance. Using the comparison between the 
pilot and control areas as described below, and assuming these areas are sufficiently 
separate labour markets from each other, we will be able to assess the extent to which 
substitution and other General Equilibrium effects combined are likely to be important 
“side-effects” of the programme, at least in the short run. 
The available options for the choice of the comparison group depend on the type of 
evaluation being performed. When assessing the programme from data on its National 
Roll Out, we are constrained to use ineligible individuals within the same area, for 
which we have chosen the age rule to define (in)eligibility. The Pilot Study, however, 
provides an additional instrument in the definition of the comparison group. We have 
used it in two ways, constructing two possible comparison groups: The first takes all 
eligible individuals living in all non-Pathfinder areas; the second matches eligible 
individuals in the set of non-Pathfinder areas that most closely resemble the Pathfinder 
areas. The goal of a careful choice of the comparison group is to satisfy a central 
assumption in non-experimental evaluation, which requires that the time trend evolve in 
the same way for treatments and controls.  
The aim of matching the areas is to achieve a match as close as possible with 
respect to labour market characteristics. The procedure followed to match on labour 
market characteristics makes use of a quarterly time-series of the outcome variable from 
1982 to just before the introduction of the New Deal, in January 1998. A measure of 
distance was then computed for each possible pair of Pathfinder and non-Pathfinder 
areas and the two nearest neighbors were chosen. Once the two nearest neighboring 
areas have been chosen based on similarity of the labour market trends, we carry out our 
                                                 
42 See Adnett and Dawson (1996) for a look at European schemes and Dickert-Conlin and Holz-Eakin 
(2000) for an extensive review of the issues.   29 
estimation (see Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2001) for details of 
these procedures).  
 
Table 1: New Deal Gateway Employment Effects for Men 
Experi-
ment 
Treatment group  Comparison group  Nr of observ. 
 
Diff-in-Diff  with 
Matching Estimator 
(1)  19-24 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
19-24 year olds living in 
all non-Pathfinder areas 
3,716 0.110** 
(0.039) 
Source: Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and van Reenen (2001) 
Notes: Estimates of the effects of the New Deal used the JUVOS 5% longitudinal sample of JSA 
claimants. By the end of the 10
th month, conditional on being on JSA for 6 months. All estimates from 
regressions including a set of other controls, namely marital status, sought occupation, region and some 
information on the labour market history (comprising the number of JSA spells and the proportion of time 
on JSA over the 2 years that precede the start of the present spell). Age and the number of JSA spells 
since 1982 are also included when similar age groups are being compared. Propensity score matching is 
done over the same covariates as the other estimates and the outcomes for the comparison groups are 
smoothed using cubic splines on the two propensity scores to achieve higher precision.  Standard errors in 
parentheses ** = significant at 0.05 level. * = significant at 0.10 level. 
 
The Results from the New Deal Pilot Areas 
Table 1 presents the main estimate of the impact of the Gateway on eligible men 
living in Pathfinder areas during the Pilot period. Precisely the effects of the Gateway 
on outflows to employment after 4 months of treatment.
43 The estimate compares men 
aged 19 to 24 years old living in Pathfinder areas with a similar 19-24 year old age 
group living in all non-Pathfinder areas. After 4 months of treatment, it is estimated that 
the Gateway has improved participants' exits into employment very significantly – 
pointing to an impact of about 10-11 percentage points. In the pre-programme period 
only 24 per cent of individuals in the treatment group obtained employment over the 
similar four months period (compared to 33 per cent afterwards). Thus, the improved 
job-search assistance provided during the Gateway seems to have raised the probability 
of getting a job by about 42% (=10%/24%) after 4 months of treatment. 
                                                 
43 All regressions in Table 1 and Table 2 include a set of other controls, including age (when similar age 
groups are being compared), marital status, region, sought occupation and labour market history 
variables. All computations have been performed excluding these covariates as well. Given the similarity 
of the results, however, we skip their presentation.   30 
This result should be contrasted with the information from the New Deal 
Evaluation Database concerning outflows into the employment option. It is estimated 
that the outflows into an employment option after 4 months of treatment sum up to 5.7 
per cent of men joining the Gateway. Subtracting this off the overall New Deal effect 
would give a “pure” Gateway impact (on outflows to unsubsidized employment) of 
about 4 per cent. But this is likely to be a lower bound. The calculation assumes that 
there is essentially no deadweight of the employer subsidy. This happens under the 
assumption that participants can be split into groups according to their ability to find a 
job, and that subsidized jobs are being attributed to those in need of a subsidy to leave 
unemployment. If, on the other extreme, it is believed that the subsidized jobs are being 
allocated to the most employable participants, then the amount of scaling down required 
might be small. Furthermore, the NDED will tend to find larger job outflows because of 
fewer missing values. Thus 4 per cent is a lower bound for the pure Gateway/job 
assistance effect. The method used to estimate the impact of treatment does not seem to 
substantially influence the results, reflecting some robustness of the estimates to the 
functional form assumptions.
44 
Table 2 considers a number of different possible comparison groups, providing 
some insight on the possible size of indirect effects. Each row in the table corresponds 
to a different comparison, including different estimates, obtained under different 
methods, of the effects of the Gateway on outflows to employment after 4 months of 
treatment. These provide some clues about the robustness of the results. We start by 
restricting the comparison group to be composed of eligible men living in matched non-
Pathfinder areas in the second row. Depending on the method used, the estimated effect 
may rise or fall slightly, but not significantly so. This evidence supports the 
comparability of the two groups used in row 1 of Table 1. 
The next row compares eligible and ineligible men aged 25 to 30 years old within 
the Pathfinder areas. Using an age-based eligibility criterion is our second main source 
of identification and is all that is available after the pilot period. The point estimates of 
                                                 
44 Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and van Reenen (2001) presents some comparisons between treatments 
and controls with respect with some of the covariates being considered, including a few checks on the 
quality of the propensity score matching.   31 
the 4 months effect using age-based are very close and insignificantly different from 
those in row 1 using different areas. 
Table 2: Further Results for the New Deal Employment Effects for Men: 
Experi-
ment 
Treatment group  Comparison group  Nr of observ. 
 
Diff-in-Diff  with 
Matching Estimator 
(2)  19-24 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 





(3)  19-24 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
25-30 year olds living in 
matched Pathfinder areas 
1,096 0.104* 
(0.055) 
(4)  19-24 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
31-40 year olds living in 
matched Pathfinder areas 
1,169 0.159** 
(0.050) 
Outflow into the employment option 
(affecting 19-24 year olds living in Pathfinder areas) 
4,486 
(5)  25-30 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
25-30 year olds living in 
all other areas 
3,180 0.016 
(0.042) 
(6)  25-30 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 





(7)  19-30 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
19-30 year olds living in 
all other areas 
6,896 0.066** 
(0.029) 
(8)  19-50 year olds living in 
Pathfinder areas 
19-50 year olds living in 
all other areas 
12,749 0.036* 
(0.021) 
Source: Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and van Reenen (2001) 
Notes: See Table 1. 
 
The estimates suggest a treatment effect of 10.4 percentage points when 25-30 year 
olds are used as the comparison group (row 3) compared to 11 percentage points when 
19-24 year olds in non-Pathfinder areas are used as a comparison group (row 1 in Table 
1). This estimate may suffer from substitution more acutely and it is not immune to 
local labour market wide wage effects. However, it is informative to know that the 
obtained results are very similar, independently of the procedure used. We cannot reject 
the simple null hypothesis of a model without substitution and equilibrium wage 
effects.
45 Alternatively, their effects may cancel out, the relative sizes of the substitution 
                                                 
45 Bartik (2000) finds relatively small displacement and substitution effects for the recent US welfare 
reforms, despite the large declines in caseload.   32 
and wage effects being very similar. We further test for substitution using the older 
group of 31 to 40s living in Pathfinder areas as control. This group is expected to be less 
substitutable for 19-24 year olds than the younger 25-30 year old comparison group. 
Under this assumption, and given that substitution exacerbates the impact of the 
programme, we would expect this estimate to be lower than the one presented in row 3. 
But the fourth row presents an estimate of the 4 months effect of the Gateway that, if 
anything is higher than the previously presented results. This is not consistent with large 
substitution effects. In rows 5 and 6 we compare ineligible individuals living in 
Pathfinder and non-Pathfinder areas. If there were significant substitution effects or 
differential trends across regions we may find differences in outflows in the New Deal 
period. In fact no significant effects of the Gateway are found.  
Finally, rows 7 and 8 in table 2 contain estimates of the employment effect in the 
“whole market”. Men aged 19 to 30 and 19 to 50 years old and living in Pathfinder 
areas are compared with similar individuals living in non-Pathfinder areas. The results 
only confirm what has been established before: that, during the Pilot period, the 
programme had a very significant positive impact on outflows to employment on the 
markets it has been implemented. The point estimates are smaller because 19-24 year 
olds are only a fraction of the larger age range. For example, just over half the 19-30 
year old group are 19-24 year olds. In the linear matching estimator in row 7 implies a 
New Deal effect of 6.6 percentage points – as expected just over half the magnitude of 
the effect in Table 1. 
Results from the New Deal National Roll Out 
Table 3 contains the main result from the National Roll Out. The first row shows 
an implied effect of around 5 per cent on a pre-programme base outflow (table 2) of 
25.8 per cent, and once more, the method used does not seem the affect the result 
significantly. Although this is still a substantial impact, it is about half the magnitude 
estimated for the Pilot period. These differences in size can be accounted for by a 
“programme introduction” effect. In the first few months the programme is operating, a 
very large increase in the flows to employment is observed, which then falls as the 
programme matures. This is illustrated in the other rows of the table. The second and 
third rows report comparable estimates of the Gateway effect after 4 months of   33 
treatment for the first quarter the programme operates in the Pathfinder and non-
Pathfinder areas, respectively. As noticed before, estimates for the Pilot period (first 
quarter in Pathfinder areas) are about twice the size of the effect over the whole period. 
The same is also true if one considers the estimates for the first quarter the New Deal 
operates in non-Pathfinder areas (see row 3). The fourth row presents estimates obtained 
using the following second and third quarters the programme is operating and these are 
comparatively much lower and less significant. 
In summary, the New Deal is a mandatory programme affecting all young people 
claiming unemployment benefit for at least six months in the UK. The programme 
offers a combination of treatments, particularly job assistance for four months and a 
wage subsidy paid to employers. Two sources of identification were used to construct 
comparison groups in order to make inferences on the impact of the New Deal: a 
comparison between Pilot and non-Pilot areas and an age-related eligibility criteria. Our 
results suggest similar quantitative effects whichever comparison group is chosen. 
 
Table 3: Employment effects from the New Deal National Roll Out 
Experi-
ment 




Overall effect for the sample including the Pilot period 
and the National Roll Out (first three quarters the ND is 




Outflows to subsidized jobs  55,051  0.039 
Effect for the Pilot period – 1
st quarter the programme 




Outflows to subsidized jobs  4,486  0.057 
Effect for the 1





Outflows to subsidized jobs  20,331  0.039 
Effect for the 2
nd and 3
rd quarters the programme 




Outflows to subsidized jobs  30,234  0.036 
Source: Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and van Reenen (2001) 
Notes: See Table 1 
 
The main finding is of an economically and statistically significant effect of the 
programme on outflows to employment among men. The programme appears to have   34 
caused an increase in the probability of young men (who had been unemployed for 6 
months) finding a job in the next four months. On average, this increase is about 5 
percentage points (relative to a pre-programme baseline of 26 per cent). Part of this 
overall effect is the job subsidy element and part is a pure “Gateway” element 
(enhanced job search). We estimate that at least 1 percentage point of the 5 percentage 
points is due to the Gateway services, such as job search assistance. We also found that 
the treatment impact is much larger in the first quarter of introduction. These findings 
are robust to a large number of experiments. 
Our results are more optimistic than many of the results from U.S. studies of the 
effects of government labour market programmes for male youth. There are three 
reasons. First, it is important to recognize that the programme was mandatory. Refusal 
to participate results in sanctions. Mandatory, sanction-enforced schemes have often 
been found to be more effective than voluntary schemes. Secondly, the "disadvantaged 
youths" we consider are less disadvantaged than those treated in typical US programmes 
(e.g. ex-offenders). To the extent that programmes are more effective on those who are 
more job ready, one would expect to see more signs of a programme effect in the UK 
than in the US. Finally, recall that we are evaluating the effects of job search assistance 
and wage subsidies. The U.S. evidence here is less pessimistic than the evidence on 
public training schemes.
46 
4.2  Evaluating the Impact of the WFTC Reform 
WFTC was introduced in October 1999. There was no piloting or randomised 
demonstrations to assist in the evaluation of the WFTC reform. To evaluate it we 
therefore adopt two approaches. The first uses an ex-ante simulation model developed 
in Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (1999).
47 This model was estimated using 
pre-reform household level data from the Family Resources Survey. In the second 
approach we use post-reform administrative figures to double-check our predictions. 
                                                 
46 See the surveys by Katz (1998) and by Meyer (1995). Also a round up of the evidence on wage subsidy 
programmes in Bell et al (1999). 
47 This work develops earlier structural labour supply simulation models by Hoynes (1996), for example.  
In particular, it allows for child care demands to vary with hours worked and it allows for fixed costs of 
work. It also accounts for take-up by incorporating welfare stigma following on from Keane and Moffitt 
(1998).    35 
We also use data from the Labour Force Survey before and after the reform. This before 
and after evaluation requires choosing a control group and here we follow the Eissa and 
Liebman (1998) study of the EITC reform and use higher educated women with 
children whose earnings are sufficiently high to render them largely ineligible to 
WFTC. To summarise: the structural model simulations appear to line up well with the 
ex-post data and can therefore be used with some confidence to assess many of the 
important aspects of designing and implementing a tax credit programme of this type. 
The simulations focus on two target groups for the WFTC reform: single parents 
and married couples with children. Nearly 50% of currently working single parents 
were found to be in receipt of some Family Credit. For married couples with children 
this proportion is smaller, at around 16%.  However, the latter group is more than two 
and half times the size of the former.  
As we have seen, the WFTC reform is designed to influence the work incentives 
of those families with low potential returns in the labour market. It does this via the 
increased generosity of in-work means-tested benefits. For single parents the WFTC 
does unambiguously increase the incentive to work. For couples, however, income 
effects from a working spouse created by the WFTC, can lead to a lower participation in 
the labour market. Table 4 presents an overall simulated impact of the reform. 
 
Table 4: WFTC Reform Simulations: Summary Impact on Employment 
Group Increase  in 
Employment 
%  point 
 change 
Single Parents  34,000  2.20 
Women in couples (Partner not working) 11,000  1.32 
Women in couples (Partner working)  -20,000  -0.57 
Married men, partner not working  13,000 0.37 
Married men, partner working  -10,500 0.30 
Total Effect  27,500   
Decrease in Workerless Families  57,000   
 
Source:  Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000) 
 
In Table 5 are the detailed simulations. Panel (a) presents the responses for 
single parents. The simulation takes around 2.2% of the sample from no work to either 
part-time or full-time work, with no offsetting movements out of the labour market. One 
can clearly see the reason for this move in to work in the earlier graphs of the potential   36 
impact of the WFTC on single parents' budget constraints. At or above 16 hours per 
week the single parent becomes eligible for WFTC (with any childcare credit addition 
to which she may be entitled). For some women this extra income makes a transition to 
part-time employment attractive. Nevertheless, the level of the aggregate behavioural 
response is perhaps lower than one might have anticipated. 
 
Table 5: WFTC Reforms, Detailed Simulation Results 
(a) Single Parents 
   post-reform    
pre-reform  out of work  part-time  Full-time  Pre-reform % 
Out of work  58.0  0.7  1.5  60.2 
Part-time  0.0 18.6 0.5 19.1 
Full-time 0.0  0.2  20.6  20.7 
Post-reform  %  58.0 19.4 22.6 100 
Change (%)  -2.2  0.3  1.9   
 
(b) Women in couples with employed partners 
   post-reform    
pre-reform  Out of work  part-time  Full-time  pre-reform % 
Out of work  32.2  0.1  0.1  32.4 
Part-time  0.3 31.6 0.0 32.0 
Full-time 0.4  0.1  35.0  35.6 
Post-reform  %  33.0 31.8 35.2 100 
Change (%)  0.6  -0.1  -0.4   
 
(c) Women in couples with partners out of work 
   post-reform    
pre-reform  out of work  part-time  Full-time  pre-reform % 
Out of work  56.8  0.4  0.9  58.1 
Part-time  0.0 22.2 0.4 22.6 
Full-time 0.0  0.1  19.2  19.3 
Post-reform  %  56.8 22.8 20.5 100 
Change (%)  -1.3  0.2  1.1   
 
Source:  Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000) 
 
We see a minor offsetting reduction in labour supply through a simulated shift 
from full-time to part-time employment among 0.2% of the sample. This is consistent 
with a small (negative) income effect among some full-time single women, for whom 
the increase in income through the WFTC encourages a reduction in labour supply.    37 
Nevertheless, the predominant incentive effect among single parents is positive. Given 
the low level of participation – a little over 40% - a 2.2 percentage point increase is 
important.  
For women in couples the simulated incentive effect is quite different. In panel (b) 
of Table 5 we report estimates of the transitions following WFTC among a sub-sample 
of women with employed partners. There is a significant overall reduction in the 
number of women in work of around 0.57%, equating to a grossed-up figure of around 
20,000 in the population.
48 This overall reduction comprises around 0.2% who move 
into the labour market following the reform, and 0.8% who move from work to non-
participation. The number of hours worked by women with employed partners is 
predicted to fall slightly, by 0.18 hours on average over the full sample.  
The predominant negative response is clearly not one that is intended, but from 
the earlier discussion one can easily see why. There will be a proportion of non-working 
women whose low earning partners will be eligible for the WFTC. The greater 
generosity of the tax credit relative to the current system of Family Credit increases 
household income. This increase in income would be lost if the woman in the household 
were to work. And for those women currently in the labour market, the WFTC increases 
the income available to the household if she were to stop working. 
In panel (c) the incentives for a sub-sample of women whose partners do not work 
are presented. For this group there is a significant overall increase of 1.32% in the 
number of women who work, equating to a grossed-up figure of around 11,000 in the 
population. The reason for this shift is more straightforward, and stems from the 
increased generosity of the basic WFTC relative to the current Family Credit system for 
those women who choose to move into work. Note that for this group the generosity of 
the childcare credit component of the WFTC is not an issue, since households only 
qualify for the childcare credit if both household members work 16 hours or more. 
There is of course potential for both members of an unemployed household to move 
into work in order to qualify for the WFTC including the childcare credit, but a joint 
simulation (not reported here) shows that such an outcome is virtually non-existent.   
                                                 
48 Interestingly a similar ‘unintended’ adverse effect on employment rates among married women has 
been documented for the EITC expansions in the US, see Eissa and Hoynes (1999).   38 
Some Recent Ex-Post Evidence 
The WFTC was introduced for all new recipients in October 1999 and fully 
phased in by April 2000. From recent administrative caseload data
49, the introduction of 
the WFTC, and the substantial increase in generosity, appears to have had a marked 
effect on the number of people claiming in-work benefits. Indeed the caseload rose by 
30% in the 12 months following May 1999.
50 












New claimer (in own right) 180 186 189 193 188 285 334 
From other MTBs 52 44 40 39 39 41 45 
Lone parents from IS 81 78 76 73 71 74 81
On WFTC already 437 449 447 454 460 485 486 
Aug 98 Nov 98 Feb 99 May 99 Aug 99 Nov 99 Feb 00
 
Source: Blundell and Brewer (2000). 
  Some of the change in WFTC caseload will be due to the increased numbers of 
already working parents who qualify for WFTC due to its increased generosity – some 
of the so called ‘windfall beneficiaries’. This alone cannot be taken as a measure of 
success in increasing employment, although it may be justified from a redistribution 
point of view. We can learn a little more by looking at administrative data on cross-
benefit flows. Figure 14 breaks down the WFTC/FC caseload by their situation 12 
months ago. It shows that a large component the caseload increase (around 75%, taking 
                                                 
49 Department of Social Security, Client Group Analysis. 
50 There has also been a large increase in take-up of the Childcare Tax Credit compared to the childcare 
disregard under Family Credit. 111,000 families were receiving help with childcare costs in May 2000, a   39 
the last 4 quarters of FC as a baseline) since October 1999 came from people who were 
not claiming any means-tested benefits or tax credits 12 months before. Both these two 
facts are consistent with the increased entitlement of the WFTC compared with FC. 
We also examine the impact on the relative employment rates of the main target 
groups. For example, Figure 15 shows the relative growth of low education to high 
education single parents. Using the high education group to control for common trends
51 
the relative increase in employment since the introduction of WFTC in late 1999 shows 
about a 2.5% rate rise, very close to the prediction in Table 4.  Figure 16 presents the 
same comparison for women in couples with children who have working partners. Here 
there is evidence of a small relative decline in participation. Again much the same as 
predicted in Table 4.  
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Source: LFS 
                                                                                                                                               
156% increase over 12 months. The average amount of costs claimed was £32 a week. But although a 
large increase, this is still only 10% of the total WFTC caseload 
 
51 See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for use of similar control groups in the evaluation of the EITC reforms. 
As mentioned above this type of before and after evaluation is often termed a ‘natural experiment’.    40 
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Source: LFS. 
 
Taken together with our simulation results these administrative statistics suggest 
that the impact of the WFTC reform on employment among low-income families in the 
UK has been positive but modest. This supports our overall view that the workings of 
the tax and benefit system in the UK together with the increased generosity to workless 
families with children, mean that changes to financial work incentives from in-work 
benefit reforms are significant but relatively small.
52 
                                                 
52 One caveat to this is the possible impact of childcare credit. Under WFTC this is a generous scheme 
available only to those in work (requiring both parents in a couples to work at least 16 hours) but it is 
currently taken up by only a small fraction of WFTC recipients. If participation in this part of the WFTC 
program was to expand significantly it could further encourage labour supply among those low-income 
parents currently who are currently out of work and claiming Income Support.   41 
4.3  The Self Sufficiency Programme (SSP) – An Experimental Evaluation 
To conclude this discussion we look more closely at an evaluation of a 
particularly interesting financial incentive programme in Canada - the Self-Sufficiency 
Programme. This is purely an experimental or demonstration programme, running in 
British Columbia and New Brunswick, and is examined in detail in Card and Robbins 
(1998). Figure 17 shows a typical budget constraint for a Canadian welfare recipient. It 
gives the budget set that an individual would face if they were earning the minimum 
wage in British Columbia, which was $6 an hour in 1993. Taking a job at a few hours a 
week attracts an earnings disregard of around $200, thereafter all earned income is 
effectively lost in a dollar-for-dollar transfer back to the income assistance programme. 
So, until recipients have exhausted their income assistance - that is working nearly 50 
hours a week - they would have no return, with an implicit tax rate of 100% on their 
earnings. 
The SSP is available to a single parent with twelve months welfare history and 
who finds a job averaging 30 hours a week over a period of a month. This is calculated 
on a monthly rolling period. Provide employment is found within the first twelve 
months of the programme, the participant remains eligible for three years. It is a 
generous system and does not change the income assistance level; so it is not, for 
example, causing more individuals who do not find employment to be on lower 
incomes. It is simply giving an earnings supplement to those who move into work.  
The experimental nature of this reform makes it particularly attractive for 
evaluation reforms that rely on financial incentive to induce welfare recipients into 
work. The experiment entailed following 6,000 families for 5 years starting in 1993. 
One-half of the group of 6,000 eligible single parents on welfare were offered the 
programme and the others were not - they are the controls. The individuals that are on 
the programme are the treatments - and we can compare those two groups. As can be 
seen for Figure 18, the control and the treatment have very similar employment patterns 
before the experiment takes place. This is an indication of a well designed experiment 
and means that the controls are really quite a good match for the treatment group. 
There is almost a doubling in employment for the treatment group. This is 
displayed in Figure 18, which also shows the close relationship between employment 
rates across the control and treatment group before the experiment began. Card and    42 
 
Figure 17:  The SSP Budget Constraint 
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Robbins (1998) report many more results. In particular, the impact on hours and 
employment is very similar.  These are low hour working individuals.  The eligibility 
criterion is that recipients work at least one week of the month for 30 hours.  For this 
experiment, the treatment group was found to have increased its hours of work, more or 
less, twofold over the control group. 
Recent evidence on the SSP, see Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001), points to the 
control groups slowly catching up with the treatment group suggesting that these 
schemes enhance the speed with which individuals move off welfare but may not have 
such a large long run impact. It is also worth noting that the wages received by the 
participants were slightly lower than those received by the controls. Suggesting that the 
‘incentivised’ group does, as one would expect, face less attractive labour market 
conditions. 
5.  Conclusions: Designing an Appropriate Welfare to Work Policy  
5.1 An Overview 
This lecture has identified several central aspects of the design of ‘welfare to work’ 
and ‘make work pay’ programmes. It focussed on two broad types of schemes. The first 
is an individually based active labour market programme that assists in job search and 
provides a wage or earnings subsidy once employment is found. Eligibility typically 
depends on a minimum duration of unemployment insurance or welfare, the subsidy is 
typically individually based and time limited. The second type of programme is an 
earned income tax credit. This also provides a wage or earnings supplement. However, 
in this case the level of the supplement is typically means tested according to family 
income and varies with family size and composition. It is also typically not time-limited 
and has no welfare or UI duration eligibility. Although both operate through a 
supplement to earned income, they operate in very different ways. Is one design better 
than another? Is one more suited to a particular group? The analysis presented in this 
paper has highlighted five central design features: targeting, time limits, hours 
conditions, incentives for wage progression, and job search assistance. 
Targeting can be by type of individual, by level of earnings and by family income. 
Each is designed to reduce cost and reduce deadweight. Targeting by type can increase 
substitution with ‘close’ types and, to be cost effective, it also typically requires some   44 
welfare/UI duration condition. But this in turn can lead to stigma effects. Targeting by 
earnings has the advantage of identifying low earners and the low skilled. But it can 
create a disincentive for effort and hours worked. It also reduces incentive for wage 
progression and skill formation in an effort based learning model. MaCurdy and 
McIntyre (2001) argue for an hourly wage based credit since this is more directly 
related to low skill, rather than simply low hours and creates less adverse effects on 
effort.
53 Targeting by income has the advantage of identifying poor families but often 
carries with it stigma effects and can create adverse family labour supply incentives. 
Operating through the tax return, as in the case of EITC (and WFTC), arguably reduce 
stigma effects. 
Turning to time limits, these can refer to time limited unemployment or welfare 
benefits as well as time limited in-work tax credits and earnings supplements. Each 
seems to effectively reduce the disincentive effects that naturally occur in welfare and 
tax credit systems. An important issue is to what extent individuals move out of the 
system or simply cycle round the system.
54 These effects can be offset by wage 
progression. Indeed, time limits on earnings supplements and subsidies may enhance the 
incentive for wage progression in some cases. Of course, a phase-out rate with wage 
progression can act as a natural time limit. But a phase-out itself acts as a disincentive 
for wage progression. 
The impact of these alternative designs on wage progression depends on the form 
of skill formation. There are typically two models used in the labour economics 
literature: (1) ‘passive’ learning by doing models, in which wage progression itself 
provides a natural ‘time limit’. However, low experience related learning for low skilled 
and low overall wage progression at some 2-3% per year suggests time limits that are 
too short, could be counter productive. (2) effort based learning/investment models in 
which withdrawal rates act as a disincentive for human capital investment. In this case a 
time limit can help offset these adverse incentives. There is some evidence of important 
active wage progression and time limits will reduce the negative effect of the phase-out 
rate. 
                                                 
53 See also the discussion in Dickert-Conlin and Holz-Eakin (2000). 
54 Meyer (1995) highlights the potential for cycling effects.   45 
The imposition of a minimum hours requirement is designed to offset the 
incentive to reduce hours which underlies a high phase-out rate. However, quite 
different levels are used: for example, 35 hours in New Deal, 30 hours in SSP, 16 hours 
in WFTC, no minimum in EITC.  If set too high they discourage work for those facing 
fixed costs of work – childcare costs, for example. It may be natural therefore to choose 
a ‘low’ limit for parents – 16 hours. Although the likelihood of wage progression in 
part-time low skilled jobs may be slight. Adequate childcare support could mitigate 
against the need to set very low minimum hours conditions. In any case, there is strong 
evidence that the incentives underlying minimum hours conditions work, as noted by 
the peaks in working hours distributions. 
A welfare or UI duration requirement reduces deadweight and targets those with 
low labour market experience.  But it may induce longer welfare durations and increases 
stigma or labelling. It also is unable to adjust to ‘shocks’ or changes in earnings that 
occur without an unemployment spell. Again we have seen that schemes vary 
considerably. The New Deal choosing 6 months of unemployment claims and the SSP 
12 months of welfare claims.  
Job search assistance seems a natural supplement to any financial incentive to 
move from welfare to work. However, the evidence is mixed. In the New Deal the 
mandatory nature of the scheme seem to have a relatively important impact but this may 
also reflect the threat of sanctions.
55 In the MFIP mandatory job search assistance also 
seems to have worked well. And this was measured through a randomised experiment. 
However, a voluntary scheme in the SSP (also experimentally evaluated), although 
having high take-up had relatively small effects on longer-term employment.  
 
5.2 An Assessment: Designing an Appropriate Welfare to Work Policy 
The aim of this lecture was to open up the discussion of ‘welfare to work’ or ‘make 
work pay’ programmes so as to define a broad set of design issues. The idea is to think 
in terms of an integrated set of policies designed to address the problems of 
subpopulations with low income, low human capital and low labour market attachment.  
                                                 
55 The review of such schemes by Meyer (1995) finds a significant (and cost effective) impact of 
mandatory job search assistance schemes operating in the late 1980s in the US.   46 
There are no magic solutions but several preferred design features emerge. There is 
strong evidence that financial incentives encourage work even among the low skilled, 
welfare dependent populations with little labour market experience. Time limiting 
seems to help with human capital incentives and self sufficiency, but the length needs to 
be gauged to allow for the relatively slow rates of wage progression that are likely to 
occur. Indeed the evidence is that wage progression is likely to be low and time limits 
should be relatively generous. Targeting welfare dependent and unemployed 
populations is also more cost effective and probably reasonably equitable provided a 
longish time limit is set. That is not to say there should not remain some overall 
negative income tax or tax credit in place, but the generosity of this can be traded off 
against the need to target certain low-income populations. Indeed, it may not be 
beneficial on the mothers of young children to work, at least in comparison to pure 
income transfers. Here there is little reliable evidence.
56 
Financial incentives appear to work better when they are individually based rather 
employer based. This may be because job mobility is an important route to wage 
progression but it also seems to be affected by issues relating to stigma. Moreover, 
mandatory job search assistance, together with sanctions, seems to play a useful role. 
Further there is no reason why help with job search and job matching should not extend 
into work. Progression and advancement in work can also be enhanced by training. This 
appears to bring higher returns if work place located, at least for lower skilled 
individuals with low levels of prior education. This is particularly the case for training 
that leads to accredited qualifications to enhance transferability. Consequently an 
additional training subsidy for the employed may be needed in addition to an individual 
financial incentive. Although, in principle, the financial incentive should allow the 
individual to bear the reduced wage during training.  
There is lots we still need to know. But there is a growing evaluation literature, 
some of which has been referred to here, which is building a large array of results on a 
wide variety of programmes, all of which try to address the problems of low income and 
low labour market attachment. This evidence is disparate and reforms are typically 
piecemeal. But they need not be. An integrated view of reform in this area needs to 
                                                 
56 For two recent important studies see Ermisch and Francesconi (2000) and Morris and Michalopoulos 
(2000).   47 
bring together welfare to work, tax credit, benefit and active labour market programmes 
under one guise so that a complete picture can be drawn of the incentives for labour 
market attachment, income progression and redistribution.  
The analysis so far suggests that a earnings tax credit programme with time 
limits that are reasonably long and which targets welfare dependency, thereby focusing 
on low human capital and low labour market attachment, could form the basis for an 
integrated view of employment tax credits and new deal style programmes.  It could 
work as a relatively low cost way of enhancing earnings and self-sufficiency among 
these target populations. 
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